Collective bargaining about corporate social responsibility
研究了追求利润最大化的企业与工会谈判时，承诺增加就业的企业社会责任目标如何降低工会的工资要求，从而提升企业利润和工会收益，实现帕累托改进。
Abstract If a profit‐maximizing firm credibly commits to an employment‐enhancing corporate social responsibility objective in negotiations with a trade union, the union can reduce its wage demands. Lower wages, ceteris paribus, raise profits, while the increase in employment enhances the payoff of a wage‐setting trade union. Therefore, both the firm and the trade union can be better off in the presence of a collectively bargained corporate social responsibility objective than in its absence. Accordingly, establishing a corporate social responsibility objective can give rise to a Pareto improvement and mitigate the inefficiency resulting from collective wage negotiations.