Competition and Certification: Theory and Evidence from the Audit Market
利用安达信意外倒闭导致审计竞争减少的外生冲击，研究发现审计竞争下降反而降低了借款人的贷款利差，原因是审计质量提升和信用风险降低，表明金融认证竞争有负面后果。
Abstract We study how financial certifier competition influences loan contracting in the context of financial auditing. Exploiting the unexpected demise of Arthur Andersen that exogenously decreased auditor competition, we find a greater decrease in loan spread for borrowers in markets in which certifier competition declined more. Additional analyses suggest the result stems from enhanced audit quality and reduced credit risk. The effect of certifier competition is stronger for borrowers with weaker external monitoring and those generating significant revenue for their auditors. Our evidence highlights negative consequences of financial certifier competition.