Political leader's background and innovation in developing countries
研究了48个发展中国家1995-2018年数据，发现军事背景的领导人更倾向于增加研发支出和专利申请，而政治任期则抑制创新，为政策制定者提供了新工具。
Studies of innovations in developing countries remain mitigated. Those that have tackled the quest for determinants have been limited to the profiles of business leaders, thus neglecting those of presidents. Yet they are the main drivers of their countries' economic policies. In order to overcome this shortcoming, this article aims to verify, in the light of the political leader theory, the effect of the profile of national leaders on innovation indicators. We formulate the following hypothesis: the preferences of political leaders are defined by their background. We test this hypothesis on a panel of 48 developing countries, covering the period from 1995 to 2018, using the GMM estimation. Results indicate that militaries spend more on R&D than other professions and enhance patent demands, while political horizon hinders innovations. The robustness of the results is verified by using other innovation indicators, in particular domestic patent applications, foreign applications, and the political regime. This article contributes to the pursuit of Sustainable Development Goal 9 by providing a new tool for policy‐makers to rely on.