Taxing versus subsidizing debt under financial frictions
研究在耐用消费品或资本作为抵押品的模型中，最优信贷市场政策是债务税还是债务补贴，发现债务补贴可能优于宏观审慎监管，且抵押品外部性导致的约束无效率不足以证明债务税是最优政策。
Abstract We examine optimal credit market policies in two models with durables/capital as collateral. Pecuniary externalities rationalize ex-ante debt taxes as macroprudential regulation, achieving constrained efficiency. Ex-post debt subsidies can implement first-best by stimulating collateral demand. Due to the same effect, debt subsidies that are constant over time can be superior to debt taxes. Saving subsidies can further enhance efficiency by addressing distributive effects of pecuniary externalities via interest rate reductions. The analysis shows that debt-increasing subsidies can outperform macroprudential regulation, and that constrained inefficiency caused by collateral externalities is insufficient to establish debt taxes as optimal credit market policies.