A model of the zone-of-interests test
本文首次从经济学角度分析行政法中的利益范围测试，利用极坐标和内积概念构建模型，解释该测试如何帮助国会限制司法审查，确保诉讼结果及时且符合立法意图。
Abstract This article offers the first comprehensive economic analysis of the zone-of-interests test from administrative law. Applying concepts from polar coordinates and inner products, we construct a model of the zone-of-interests test that provides answers to many of the puzzling questions stemming from the doctrine. The results suggest that the zone-of-interests test can be understood as Congress’s attempt to cabin judicial review to ensure that litigation based on administrative rule challenges would lead to outcomes that are timely and consistent with Congress’s intent behind the subject statute. Our model also illustrates a relationship between the zone-of-interests doctrine and the standing doctrine. In extensions, we also consider how the doctrine can be rationalized as safeguarding against substantive court errors and economizing on judicial resources, and why certain statutes may include citizen-suit provisions while others do not.