Better monitoring …Worse outcome?
研究企业利用新技术收集更多工人绩效信息时，非契约信息可能被滥用，导致过度惩罚，进而降低工人努力和总剩余，揭示了“更好监控导致更差结果”的机制。
Abstract New technologies allow firms to collect more information about worker performance than ever before. How will this extra information—much of which is non‐contractible and is used at the firm's discretion—impact incentives? I highlight a better monitoring/worse outcome channel that speaks to these concerns. Some improvements to monitoring tempt the firm to punish excessively. Workers then demand contracts with a small punishment threat. Without a serious punishment threat, effort and surplus decline. I characterize what kinds of improvements to monitoring lead to a worse outcome and explore how technologies can be designed to mitigate the better monitoring/worse outcome effect.