Tariffs and Foreign Direct Investment in a Dynamic North–South Model
用质量阶梯模型分析发达国家和发展中国家的进口关税如何影响创新和外国直接投资，发现北方关税阻碍创新和投资，南方关税则相反，解释了现实中南方更倾向加征关税的现象。
Abstract This paper examines how import tariffs by a developed country (the North) and a developing country (the South) affect innovation and foreign direct investment (FDI) using a quality ladder model. We show that a Northern import tariff raises the relative wage of Northern labor, but impedes innovation and FDI. This may worsen Northern welfare. By contrast, a Southern import tariff raises the relative wage of Southern labor and promotes innovation and FDI. This can improve Southern welfare. These imply that the South has a stronger incentive than the North to impose an import tariff, which is consistent with actual observation.