Central Bank Independence at Low Interest Rates
通过分析美联储主席国会证词，发现低利率下非常规政策引发更多政治批评，进而威胁央行独立性，并建立模型说明这会导致货币政策反应减弱和通胀波动加剧。
Abstract We create a new measure of the political pressure faced by the Federal Reserve based on the analysis of transcripts of the Chairs' testimonies to Congress. We find that the use of nontraditional policies at low interest rates led to increased political criticism and that criticism predicts legislative actions that threaten central bank independence. We develop a model where the probability of the monetary authority's future loss of independence is increasing in the use of nontraditional instruments, leading to attenuated monetary responses and higher inflation volatility. This attenuation can be mitigated under an institutional framework with clearly defined targets where the central bank is evaluated by how efficiently it achieves its goals.