The Political Economy of Technocratic Governments
用博弈论模型研究技术官僚政府，发现只有当技术官僚比普通政治家更有能力时，政党才会同意将议程设置权委托给他们，且议会不稳定和极化会增加技术官僚政府出现的可能性。
Abstract This paper proposes a game theoretical model of technocratic government, i.e. cases where a non political technocrat is put in charge by political parties. We find conditions for the existence of a technocratic government equilibrium, where parties agree to delegate the agenda setting power to technocrats, committed to maximize social welfare. Such an equilibrium exists only if technocrats are more competent than ordinary politicians. Furthermore, we show that unstable parliaments increase the range of parameters where a technocratic government equilibrium exists. Polarization can also increase the likelihood of a technocratic government.