Debtor (Non-)Participation in Sovereign Debt Relief: A Real Option Approach
用实物期权理论解释发展中国家为何不愿参与主权债务减免，发现预期偿债节省大或债务困境风险高的国家更早申请暂停偿债，并讨论了提高参与吸引力的政策。
Abstract Developing countries have recently proved reluctant to participate in sovereign debt moratoria and debt relief initiatives. This paper argues that debtors’ (non-)participation decisions can be understood through the lens of real options. Eligible countries compare the net benefits of participating in a debt relief initiative now with the value of waiting to potentially execute their participation option later, when they may have more information on benefits and costs. The analysis corroborates the real option framing with anecdotal evidence and through a survival analysis showing that debtor countries with larger expected debt service savings or higher pre-existing risks of debt distress were quicker to apply for the Debt Service Suspension Initiative, which provided temporary debt moratoria during the COVID-19 pandemic. The paper discusses policies that can make participation in debt relief initiatives more attractive to debtor countries.