Leadership in a social dilemma: Does it matter if the leader is pro‐social or just says they are pro‐social?
研究领导者声称自己亲社会（即使不完全可信）能否提升群体合作效率，发现真实亲社会的领导者带来最高合作水平，但声称亲社会也能提高效率。
Abstract Previous studies have shown that pro‐social leaders cooperate, on average, more than pro‐self leaders in social dilemmas. It can, thus, be beneficial for the group to have a pro‐social leader. In this paper we analyze the consequences of a leader informing followers that they are pro‐social (or pro‐self). In doing so, we compare a setting in which the leader's type is truthfully revealed to settings where the leader can ‘hide’ or ‘lie’ about their pro‐sociality. We find that a leader saying they are pro‐social boosts efficiency, even if the signal is not fully credible. Cooperation is highest in a truth setting with a pro‐social leader. We demonstrate that these results are consistent with a belief‐based model of social preference in which the stated type of the leader changes the frame of reference for followers.