Dual Moral Hazard and the Tyranny of Success
研究了当前成功如何削弱组织创新能力，通过一个双人赌博机模型，发现当委托人无法承诺资源分配时，代理人安装风险项目的激励与委托人过早停止实验的激励形成双重道德风险，且安全项目越成功问题越严重。
I explain why current success can undermine an organization’s ability to innovate. I consider a standard bandit problem between a safe and a risky arm with two modifications. First, a principal allocates resources. Second, an agent must install the risky arm, which is not contractible. If the principal cannot commit to a resource policy, a dual moral hazard problem emerges: The agent’s pay must be tied to the risky arm’s success to encourage installation, inducing the principal to stop experimenting with the arm prematurely. This problem intensifies as the safe arm becomes more profitable, potentially leaving the organization worse off.