Voluntary disclosure of verifiable information with general preferences and information endowment uncertainty
研究了发送者偏好与接收者偏好不同时，发送者如何选择性地披露可验证信息，发现当发送者偏好不敏感时倾向于披露中等消息而隐瞒极端消息，反之则披露极端消息，后者更符合管理自愿披露的实证发现。
Abstract We study a voluntary disclosure model with verifiable information, a range of sender and receiver preferences, and uncertainty about whether the sender is informed. When a sender's preferences are insensitive to the state relative to the receiver's, a sender discloses moderate news and suppresses extreme news. We also find a partial revelation equilibrium where the sender's message is an interval containing the realized state. When a sender's preferences are sensitive to the state relative to the receiver's, the sender withholds moderate news and discloses extreme news. The latter disclosure is more consistent with extant empirical findings about voluntary managerial disclosure.