The Carrot and the Stick: Bank Bailouts and the Disciplining Role of Board Appointments
研究了美国资本购买计划中政府任命独立董事的权力如何约束银行行为，发现银行避免触发该条款，且任命后银行绩效提升、CEO薪酬下降。
We empirically examine the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) used by the US government to bail out distressed banks and its implications for regulatory policy. We find strong evidence that a feature of the CPP—the government’s ability to appoint independent directors on the board of an assisted bank that missed six dividend payments to the Treasury—had a significant effect on bank behavior. Banks were averse to these appointments—the empirical distribution of missed payments exhibits a sharp discontinuity at five. Director appointments by the Treasury were associated with improved bank performance and lower CEO pay.