The Signalling Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting: Evidence From Short Selling
利用中国逐步取消卖空限制的外生政策变化，研究发现可卖空企业的社会责任报告质量显著提升，且该效应在面临更大下行压力、负面盈利消息、高破产风险等企业更强，表明企业通过社会责任报告向市场传递积极信号。
Using exogenous regulatory changes that have gradually removed short‐sale restrictions in China's stock exchanges, we examine how such deregulation influences firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting. Our findings indicate a significant improvement in the calibre of CSR reporting among firms designated as qualified for short selling in a deregulation pilot program (pilot firms) compared to non‐pilot firms. Moreover, our empirical evidence shows that the improvement in CSR reporting practices is greater for pilot firms experiencing stronger downward price pressure, negative earning news, higher bankruptcy risk, greater ownership concentration, and those classified as state‐owned enterprises. These results demonstrate that firms susceptible to price declines from short selling utilize CSR reporting as a visible and credible signal to safeguard and enhance corporate reputation, garnering increased stakeholder support.