Central bank digital currency and bank intermediation: Medium of Exchange vs. Savings vehicle
在一个一般均衡模型中分析零售央行数字货币对银行中介的影响，发现当CBDC作为储蓄工具与储蓄存款竞争时，去中介化程度几乎是仅用于交易时的两倍。
This paper analyzes the effects of a retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) on bank intermediation within a general equilibrium model and provides a quantitative assessment. In the model, banks offer both transaction and savings deposits. This allows to study how a CBDC’s impact varies based on its usage as a medium of exchange or as a savings vehicle. When a CBDC is used as a savings vehicle that competes with savings deposits, the level of disintermediation almost doubles compared to a scenario where the CBDC is used solely for transactions and competes only with transaction deposits.