Unintended environmental consequences of anti-corruption strategies
研究了巴西联邦反腐败审计对森林砍伐的意外影响，发现审计反而使亚马逊地区森林砍伐增加约10%，尤其在选举年和畜牧业发达地区，揭示了反腐败政策可能加剧政商合谋的非预期后果。
High agricultural profits motivate politicians to collude with local elites and ignore illegal conversion of natural forests. Fighting corruption through fiscal audits can improve local governance in general but may also unintentionally intensify such collusion and rent extraction activities within the less scrutinized forestry sector. This paper highlights such unintended consequences of a federal anti-corruption strategy in Brazil by documenting the causal effects of randomized fiscal audits on deforestation dynamics, a non-targeted outcome. Between 2003 and 2011, public audits of federal funds increased deforestation by about 10% in municipalities of the Brazilian Amazon within the first three years after the audit. The audits triggered forest loss, especially during election years, in municipalities governed by first-term mayors who managed to win re-elections afterward, and in places with a high share of cattle ranching, indicating potential collusion between local politicians and the agricultural sector.