How institutionalized feedback works: Online citizen complaints and local government responsiveness in China
研究基于中国最大在线信访平台和武汉地方网站的数百万条投诉数据，发现在线投诉比非投诉更能获得政府回应，这种制度化反馈机制由上级对负面反馈的期望和官员自保动机共同驱动，但也警示过度依赖投诉管理可能阻碍实质性改革。
Abstract The prevailing view that authoritarian regimes primarily respond to threats of instability is challenged by our research, which posits that such regimes also take citizen complaints seriously, even when they do not pose a direct threat. Based on 238,835 citizen claims from China's largest national online petition platform from 2020 to 2021 and 793,119 citizen claims from Wuhan's local petition website, this study reveals that online complaints result in greater governmental responsiveness, compared to non‐complaints. This institutionalized feedback mechanism is driven by a mix of factors: the upper‐level officials' expectation for negative feedback, combined with bureaucrats' efforts to preserve themselves and avoid punitive consequences. Our findings thus enhance the understanding of what drives authoritarian responsiveness and signal a caution that an overreliance on managing complaints may deepen a stability‐maintenance mechanism, potentially impeding substantial reform.