The Role of Intermediaries in Selection Markets: Evidence from Mortgage Lending
研究了加拿大抵押贷款市场中经纪人的作用，发现经纪人客户与银行客户在贷款选择上存在差异，经纪人影响产品选择，但借款人选择高杠杆产品的主要原因是未观察到的偏好。
Abstract We study the role of brokers in selection markets. We find broker-clients in the Canadian mortgage market are observationally different from branch-clients. They finance larger loans with more leverage and longer amortization. We build and estimate a model of mortgage demand to disentangle three possible explanations for these riskier product choices: (1) selection on observables, (2) unobserved borrower preferences for riskier loans, and (3) a causal effect of brokers. Although we find that brokers influence product choices, the main reason borrowers choose high-leverage products is unobserved preferences. Borrowers prefer larger loans and brokers facilitate qualification for them.