The impact of pension reform on employment, retirement, and disability insurance claims
利用挪威2011年提前退休制度改革，发现改善工作激励显著提高就业率，降低提前退休和残疾保险退出；降低养老金领取年龄则小幅提升就业并大幅减少残疾保险参与。
Abstract We evaluate the 2011 comprehensive reform of Norwegian early retirement institutions using a parsimonious random utility choice model. Conditional on employment at age 60, we estimate a three-state conditional logit model to explain the realized labor market state at age 63 among the alternatives of employment, retirement, and disability program participation. The reform radically changed work incentives and/or pension access age for some (but not all) workers, such that the influence of economic incentives can be identified based on reform-generated variation only. We find that improved work incentives caused employment rates to rise considerably at the expense of early retirement and exit through disability insurance. Improved liquidity through a lower age to access own pension funds on actuarially neutral terms caused a small increase in employment and a large drop in disability program participation. Properly designed pension reforms thus need to take the interplay between old-age pension and disability insurance programs into account.