Testing the effects of merit appointments and bureaucratic autonomy on governmental performance: Evidence from African bureaucracies
利用非洲国家面板数据，研究发现基于功绩的官僚任命能提升交通、教育、饮用水等公共服务效果，而官僚自主性与服务效果关系不大。
Abstract Appointing bureaucrats based on merit and protecting them from excessive political interference have become bedrocks of modern bureaucracy. Populist leaders throughout the world, however, are looking to undermine merit systems and politicize bureaucracies. This study analyzes the impact of merit‐based appointments and bureaucratic autonomy on service delivery effectiveness, using longitudinal data from a panel of African countries. Throughout Africa, social, economic, and political conditions have made it difficult for meritocratic and autonomous bureaucracies to take root and flourish as they have elsewhere. Despite these challenges, the study's main finding is that the practice of appointing bureaucrats based on merit has a positive effect on the provision of public services like transportation infrastructure, standardized education, drinking water, sanitation, and waste disposal. Political leaders undercutting meritocratic civil services and expanding patronage appointments do so at their own peril due to the adverse consequences of their actions on governmental performance. Little evidence is found of a relationship between bureaucratic autonomy and service delivery effectiveness.