On excessive entry in Bayes‐Cournot oligopoly
研究了在贝叶斯-古诺寡头市场中，企业私下知道自身边际成本时，提高进入壁垒（如征收适度的进入成本）如何增加预期产出、利润和总福利，甚至可能惠及消费者。
Abstract In a Cournot industry where firms are privately informed about their marginal costs, raising entry barriers (i.e., imposing strictly positive, but not too large, entry costs) increases expected output, entrants' profits, total welfare, and might benefit consumers. Under Bayes‐Cournot competition, firms react to the expectation (conditional on entry) of rivals' costs rather than to their actual costs. This creates scope for entry by relatively inefficient types. Entry costs that prevent these high‐cost types from entering increase inframarginal (lower‐cost) types' and rivals' expected output. As a result, they increase profits and, unless they reduce output variability too much, also consumer surplus.