Are Risky Banks Disciplined by Large Corporate Depositors?
通过分析企业向银行拍卖无担保货币市场存款的数据，发现存款利率随银行风险上升而提高，存款人倾向于选择风险较低的银行，且银行在存款被较少选择后会降低风险，高风险银行最终退出市场，待风险降低后重新进入。
Abstract We analyze depositor discipline using auctions of unsecured money market deposits of firms to banks. In each auction, only the firm observes the banks and their interest rate bids. We observe that deposit interest rate bids increase with bank risk. Conditional on the same interest rate bid and firm–bank relationship, depositors select less risky banks. Banks reduce their risk after their deposit offers are less often selected. Risky banks eventually exit the market, and reenter when they become safer. This has important implications for banks’ access to unsecured corporate funding, financial stability, and our understanding of market discipline more broadly.