Stress Tests, Information Disclosure, and Credit Line Runs
研究发现，公开披露银行压力测试结果不佳会引发企业挤兑信贷额度，即企业从表现差的银行提取更多可用资金，同时这些银行会提前缩减额度并减少后续贷款。
Abstract The public disclosure of bank‐level stress test results, while informative for market participants, can adversely affect underperforming entities. We uncover a novel cost of disclosing unfavorable stress test results: credit line runs. Using Spanish Credit Register data and the 2011 European Banking Authority stress test, we find that, after results were released, firms drew down about 10 percentage points more available funds from credit lines granted by banks with poor stress test performance. In addition, these banks reduced credit line sizes more before the release and were more likely to cut term lending to firms without credit lines afterward.