Dare to Fight? How Activist Hedge Funds’ Hostile Tactics Influence Target Firm Resistance
研究积极主义对冲基金使用敌对策略时，目标公司为何更可能抵抗，基于认知机制和731个案例发现，管理层和董事会因控制欲、自我威胁和焦虑而增强抵抗，且受管理层职位威胁和过往经验影响。
Hedge fund activism has become an integral part of publicly traded firms, and our paper adopts a behavioral lens to examine how the hostility of tactics employed by activist hedge funds may influence the response of target firms. Drawing on cognitive mechanisms and insights from interviews with investment professionals, we propose that activists’ use of hostile tactics may paradoxically trigger greater resistance from target firms. Specifically, we argue that management and the board may seek greater desire for control, and experience ego threat and heightened anxiety in the face of hostility, which increases target firm resistance. Using a sample of 731 activist hedge fund campaigns from 2002 to 2015, we find that target firms are more likely to resist when the activist hedge fund uses more hostile tactics. Further, our findings indicate that resistance towards hostile tactics increases when activist demands challenge the position of management or the board, but is mitigated by a firm’s prior activism experience or boards with more directors that have experienced hostile campaigns.