Asset Exemption in Bankruptcy, Access to and Cost of Credit
研究了美国个人破产法中资产豁免如何影响信贷市场，发现高豁免使抵押品更具信息价值，在严重逆向选择下导致安全型企业家面临高抵押、低成本和信贷配给。
Abstract Under the U.S. personal bankruptcy law, exempt assets are not liquidated following bankruptcy. Entrepreneurs can undo such a protection by posting collateral. We provide a complete characterization of the interplay between asset exemption from liquidation upon default and adverse selection in a competitive credit market. Severe adverse selection induces separation, with safer entrepreneurs choosing loan contracts characterized by high collateral requirements, lower cost of credit, and credit rationing for wealth‐constraints applicants. Irrespective of adverse selection, poor safe entrepreneurs pool as they face too much rationing, otherwise. Higher exemption makes collateral more informative. Evidence from the Survey of Small Business Finances survey supports our theory.