Polarized corporate boards
研究发现董事间的政治极化会降低董事会有效性，表现为CEO强制更替对业绩的敏感性下降，并导致投资-Q敏感性和ESG表现降低，揭示了政治极化的真实经济成本。
We show that political polarization among directors negatively affects corporate board effectiveness by reducing forced CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. Our results are more pronounced in presidential election years and for firms with more monitoring and advising needs. Polarization also increases the departure likelihood for directors who are ideologically distant from the rest of the board, making boards more politically homogeneous over time. Finally, we show that polarization in the boardroom lowers firms' investment- Q sensitivity and Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) performance. Our findings highlight the real economic cost of political polarization.