On bargaining norms as solutions to cost–minimization problems
研究当代理人可以偏离社会规范但需付出成本时，哪些讨价还价结果最容易被社会维持为规范，推导出纳什解、卡莱-斯莫罗金斯基解等不同解概念。
This paper studies bargaining outcomes in economies in which agents may be able to impose outcomes that deviate from the relevant social norms but incur costs when they do so. It characterizes bargaining outcomes that are easiest for a society to sustain as part of a social norm that everybody will want to follow. Depending on technological assumptions, the approach yields the Nash bargaining solution, the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution, the equal monetary split, and other bargaining solutions. Set‐valued solution concepts are derived that are relevant if one is unable or unwilling to make specific technological assumptions.