The spontaneous provision of criminal law
研究了巴西贫民窟中非国家行为体自发提供刑法的现象，用人类经济学框架分析这种不纯公共物品的私人供给，发现无需公共干预或价格体系，仅凭非正式规范即可实现。
Abstract For decades, non-state actors have supplied criminal law in Brazil’s favelas. This paper offers a humanomics account of the private provision of an impure public good. Our analysis reaches three conclusions. First, criminal law can be provided without either public intervention or reliance on the price system. Informal norms may be sufficient, indicating that Adam Smith’s invisible hand logic extends beyond legal markets grounded in private property rights and governed by well-defined prices. Second, a common sense of propriety, a key aspect of the humanomics approach, may not always be context-free. One’s environment may shape the precise objects of propriety. Third, spontaneous legal orders can be robust to agent type.