Changing Central Bank Pressures and Inflation
提出一个长期总供给总需求框架，分析外生经济和政治因素如何通过中央银行自由裁量权影响长期通胀，并解释过去四十年全球通胀下降的原因，指出未来需加强央行独立性或债务政策可信度以维持低通胀。
ABSTRACT: We introduce a simple long-run aggregate demand and supply framework for evaluating long-run inflation. The framework illustrates how exogenous economic and political economy factors generate pressures that, in the presence of central bank discretion, can have an impact on long-run inflation as well as transitions between steady states. We use the analysis to provide a fresh perspective on the forces that drove global inflation downward over the past four decades. We argue that for inflation to remain low and stable in the future, political economy factors, such as strengthened central bank independence or more credible public debt policy, would need to offset the global economic pressures now pushing average long-run inflation upward.