Organizational Governance and Trade‐Offs Between Pay and Subjective Employee Well‐Being: A Comparative Analysis
研究组织治理形式如何影响员工在薪酬与内在回报之间的权衡，基于35个欧洲国家的调查数据，发现不同治理类型下员工的主观幸福感和薪酬存在系统性差异。
ABSTRACT The incompleteness of labour contracts is expected to cause uncertainty among forward‐looking employees as to whether implicit contracts with greater intrinsic rewards in lieu of pay will be breached by employers, thus reducing employee well‐being. David Marsden theorized that an organization's form of governance can serve as a stable, easy‐to‐observe signal of the likelihood of a breach, and thus employees across governance types will exhibit different extrinsic–intrinsic trade‐offs. Using the European Working Conditions Survey, we extend Marsden's theory and find supportive evidence across 35 European countries and 9 governance categories. We also extend Marsden's theorizing into the comparative domain and analyse patterns of subjective well‐being, compensatory pay and organizational governance across varieties of political economies.