Private and state-owned banks in times of high instability. Mexico 1977–1990
研究了1982年墨西哥银行国有化后，银行如何在宏观经济不稳定中保持盈利和稳健，挑战了国有银行效率低的传统观点，但指出盈利主要来自政府。
In 1982, immediately after the Latin American debt crisis began, the Mexican government expropriated the country’s private banks. The debt crisis emerged in the context of macroeconomic instability, which lasted throughout the 1980s. This paper explains how banks navigated macroeconomic instability and demonstrates that even as state-owned intermediaries, they can maintain profitability and soundness. Mexican banks undertook risks that jeopardised their stability before the crisis, but after they became state-owned enterprises, they remained profitable and faced low credit risk. This evidence contrasts with the traditional view that government-owned banks tend to be less profitable. However, this profitability originated mostly from government sources. The government’s strategy was motivated by the need to use the banks to finance its deficit and by its political interest in compensating former shareholders for the expropriation. Consequently, financial development stagnated.