Ambiguous Contracts
研究了委托人故意在合同中加入模糊性，当代理人规避模糊性时，委托人能从中获益，且收益可任意高，但混合行动会消除这一优势。
We explore the deliberate infusion of ambiguity into the design of contracts. We show that when the agent is ambiguity‐averse and hence chooses an action that maximizes their minimum utility, the principal can strictly gain from using an ambiguous contract, and this gain can be arbitrarily high. We characterize the structure of optimal ambiguous contracts, showing that ambiguity drives optimal contracts toward simplicity. We also provide a characterization of ambiguity‐proof classes of contracts, where the principal cannot gain by infusing ambiguity. Finally, we show that when the agent can engage in mixed actions, the advantages of ambiguous contracts disappear.