Difference in Deference: When Competitors Do Not Give in Despite Having Lost
研究了在竞赛中失败方为何有时不服从胜者，提出当失败方将对手视为长期对手且能从当前竞赛中获得独立收益时，他们不会如预期般服从，一级方程式赛车数据支持了该理论。
When a contest is decided, the inferior competitor is supposed to defer to the superior opponent. Yet, sometimes the losing actors refuse to give in. We theorize why and when losing actors do not defer—even when they are supposed to. We hypothesize that when the losing actors categorize their relationship with an opponent as rivalrous beyond the current contest and may obtain some contest-specific gains independent of the focal encounter, they will not defer as much as expected. Unique data from Formula One racing prove strong support. Our findings contribute to research on deference as well as on competition and rivalry. Our study also has broader implications as it helps explain when people do not respect social norms while competing—be it for rewards, for promotions, or in elections.