Financial Regulators on Boards: Evidence From Earnings Information Quality
研究发现，具有金融监管背景的董事与较低的盈余质量相关，但这种低盈余质量反映的是战略选择而非机会主义操纵，且市场对这类董事的任命反应更积极。
ABSTRACT We find that directors with a financial regulatory background are associated with lower earnings quality. The influence of financial regulatory directors (FRDs) is more substantial for firms with higher proprietary costs and FRDs with greater expertise and experience. FRD firms do not have a greater likelihood of financial misconduct or meeting or beating analysts' forecasts. The stock market reacts more positively to FRD appointments than to the appointments of other directors. Our findings suggest that FRDs certify firm discipline, with lower earnings quality reflecting strategic choices rather than opportunistic manipulation, highlighting the impact of postemployment restrictions in financial regulatory agencies.