Dynamic Gains from Trade Agreements with Intellectual Property Provisions
构建了一个多国增长模型，量化分析包含知识产权条款的贸易协定，发现发展中国家短期受损而发达国家持续获益，且短视政策会牺牲长期增长。
I develop a quantitative theory of bilateral trade agreements with intellectual property (IP) provisions in a multicountry growth model. The model’s dynamics are driven by innovation and technology licensing. Imperfect IP enforcement leads to reduced royalty payments and growth. Governments negotiate tariffs and IP enforcement through Nash bargaining. Gains from the trade agreement vary along the transition. Developing countries experience short-term losses, while developed countries gain in both the short and long runs. A government with short-term goals may reduce losses but at the cost of lower growth and welfare. Tariffs could discourage developing countries from deviating from the agreement.