Management forecasts: Biases, incentives, and spillover effects
研究了管理层盈利预测的溢出效应，即预测如何影响后续经营决策和盈余报告，并分析了哪些经理人会发布预测以及允许误报盈余为何可能提高预期盈余。
Abstract Management earnings forecasts (MEF), a form of voluntary disclosure, are different from most other disclosures because MEF have spillover effects on managers' subsequent operating decisions and earnings reports. These effects arise from managers' attempts to reduce their forecast errors. Even though managers can separate their firms from less profitable firms by issuing forecasts the latter cannot match, there is no equilibrium where all managers issue forecasts. We show that managers who issue (resp., don't issue) MEF choose above (resp., below) first‐best operating actions. We identify which managers issue MEF and why allowing managers to misreport earnings may increase expected earnings.