Environmental taxes, offshoring and welfare: The effects of environmental damage and pollution intensity
研究了国内环境损害和污染强度如何影响垄断企业将关键中间品生产离岸外包的动机，发现更高的环境税可能减少离岸外包，而污染强度较低时离岸外包和污染泄漏反而增加。
We analyze the effects of domestic environmental damage and pollution intensity on a monopolist final good producer’s incentive for offshoring a critical intermediate good. Contrary to the usual pollution haven hypothesis, we find that a higher domestic environmental damage, which creates a higher domestic environmental tax, may decrease the incentive for offshoring. This trend is enhanced by a higher pollution intensity of the final good production. Hence, a lower pollution intensity of the final good production may increase offshoring and pollution leakage. Offshoring in our analysis can be excessive or insufficient from the point of view of the domestic country.