不完全信息下的不当行为与声誉

Misconduct and Reputation under Imperfect Information

Journal of Political Economy · 2024
被引 4
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

通过在加纳移动货币市场进行实地实验,研究双向反不当行为信息项目对减少欺诈行为(降低72%)及提升市场活动、消费者福利和企业收入的效果。

Abstract

Misconduct—market actions that are unethical and indicative of fraud—is a significant yet poorly understood issue that underlies many economic transactions. We design a field experiment to study the impact of two-sided antimisconduct information programs, which we deploy on the local markets for mobile money (“human ATMs”) in Ghana. The programs lead to a large reduction in misconduct (−21⁢ percentage points=−72%) and, as a result, broader improvements in overall market activity, consumer welfare, and firm revenue. We show the treatment effect is due to a combination of more accurate consumer beliefs about misconduct and increased vendor reputation concerns.

不完全信息不当行为声誉现场实验