多行动下的说服

Persuasion with Multiple Actions

Journal of Political Economy · 2024
被引 0
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

研究了贝叶斯说服模型中多个接收者各自采取一个行动的情形,比较了同时行动与序贯行动程序,并刻画了最优序贯程序带来更高收益的条件及最优行动顺序。

Abstract

We consider a Bayesian persuasion model in which multiple receivers take one action each. We compare simultaneous procedures with sequential ones. In a simultaneous procedure, all the receivers act simultaneously following the realization of a single public signal. In a sequential procedure, receivers receive information and take actions sequentially. We characterize the conditions under which the optimal sequential procedure leads to a higher payoff and characterize the optimal ordering of actions.

贝叶斯劝说序贯行动信息设计信号策略