A Theory of Fiscal Responsibility and Irresponsibility
提出一个政治经济学机制，解释财政体制如何被危机时期打断，在负责任与不负责任两种体制间转换，对研究政府债务和财政纪律的学者有参考价值。
We propose a political economy mechanism that explains the presence of fiscal regimes punctuated by crisis periods. Our model focuses on the interaction between successive deficit-biased governments subject to independently and identically distributed fiscal shocks. We show that the economy transitions between a fiscally responsible regime and a fiscally irresponsible regime, with transitions occurring during crises when fiscal needs are large. Under fiscal responsibility, governments limit their spending to avoid transitioning to fiscal irresponsibility. Under fiscal irresponsibility, governments spend excessively and precipitate crises that lead to the reinstatement of fiscal responsibility. Regime transitions can occur only if governments’ deficit bias is large enough.