Local Political Corruption and Financial Reporting Conservatism
研究发现中国政治腐败更严重地区的企业采用更稳健的会计政策，这种关系在2012年反腐运动后减弱，且在企业被腐败官员侵占风险较低时也减弱。
ABSTRACT We document that firms in more politically corrupt regions of China adopt more conservative accounting. The relation between local political corruption and accounting conservatism weakens after China’s anticorruption campaign launched in 2012 and in firms with a lower risk of expropriation by corrupt officials, stronger incentives to report earnings aggressively, or greater gains from corruption. Further analysis shows that accounting conservatism and alternative corporate strategies complement each other in shielding firms against corrupt officials’ expropriation of corporate resources. Our study provides novel evidence about an accounting approach used by firms in response to perceived political costs. JEL Classifications: D22; D72; D73; M41.