Dissecting Child Penalties
利用法国行政数据，研究发现母亲因孩子导致的收入损失随潜在小时工资分布递减，低工资母亲更易退出劳动市场或减少工时，而父亲不受影响，表明经济激励和性别规范共同导致生育相关的性别不平等。
The authors relate mothers’ children-related labor earnings losses, referred to here as child penalties, to their location in the distribution of potential hourly wages. Using French administrative data and based on an event study approach, the authors show that the magnitude of these earnings losses decreases steeply along that distribution. This heterogeneity is the result of low-wage mothers leaving the labor market and more frequently reducing their working hours. By contrast, fathers’ labor market outcomes do not vary upon the arrival of children, regardless of their location in the distribution of potential hourly wages. These marked differences suggest that the pervasive part of life-cycle gender inequality associated with parenthood is related to both financial incentives and gender norms.