Exploitative Contracting in a Life Cycle Savings Model
分析了一个有现时偏差的储蓄者与追求利润的金融机构之间的互动，发现现时偏差者会因收入效应强弱而选择低收益低费用或高收益高费用的低效合同，且剥削性合同会使其养老金财富减少8%。
Abstract This paper analyses the interaction between a present-biased saver and profit-maximising financial providers. Using a tractable theoretical model, I find that a naïve present-biased agent selects an ‘ineffciently cheap’ (low-yield, low-fee) contract when the income effect of an interest rate change is sufficiently strong, and an ‘inefficiently expensive’ (high-yield, high-fee) contract otherwise. Subsequently, I embed the contract choice in a calibrated life-cycle model. Given the extent of present bias, exploitative contracting reduces the naïve agent's pension wealth by 8%, lowering expected annual consumption in retirement by 3%. The associated loss of consumer welfare corresponds to 0:23% of annual consumption.