Executive Equity‐Based Compensation and Tournament Incentives
研究发现CEO晋升锦标赛的失败者会通过盈利性出售股权来弥补晋升激励的损失，且更可能参与竞争和面临更大奖金损失的交易更积极，这削弱了锦标赛激励与公司绩效的关系。
ABSTRACT We find that the losers in CEO promotion tournaments sell their equity holdings profitably to mitigate the reductions in the promotion‐based component of their contracts. They avoid selling before losing the contest to maximize their promotion probabilities. Those who are more likely to compete in the tournament and to face a greater forgone tournament prize trade more aggressively. Our results suggest that tournament losers consider their trading opportunities as outside options to compensate themselves ex‐post. This strategy weakens the relationship between tournament incentives and firm performance and highlights new implications for tournament incentives models, compensation committees, and insider trading regulations.