The Real State: Inside the Congo’s Traffic Police Agency
研究刚果金金沙萨交通警察机构的腐败机制，发现官员联盟通过勒索司机获取远超罚款的非法收入，并揭示这种看似理性的行为如何破坏公共服务。
This paper provides insight into a corruption scheme in Kinshasa’s traffic police agency. First, various data collection branches show that the agency’s revenue is five times that from fines and is derived from a coalition of traffic police officials, their managers, and judicial police officers scheming to extort drivers. Second, the analysis of an experiment suggests that the scheme subverts service. Third, the scheme appears to be a rational response to the context, but its logic is widespread. The findings suggest that coalitions of officials, while being socially costly, can yield large illicit revenue, nuancing the notion of state weakness.