Bias and Sensitivity under Ambiguity
研究了信息分散环境下模糊厌恶的影响，发现均衡结果等价于对基本面更敏感且有悲观偏差的贝叶斯预测，有助于解释通胀预测的偏差与持续性模式。
This paper characterizes the effects of ambiguity aversion under dispersed information. The equilibrium outcome is observationally equivalent to a Bayesian forecast of the fundamental with increased sensitivity to signals and a pessimistic bias. This equivalence result takes a simple form that accommodates dynamic information and strategic interactions. Applying the result, we show that ambiguity aversion helps rationalize the joint empirical pattern between the bias and persistence of inflation forecasts conditional on household income. In a policy game à la Barro and Gordon (1983) with ambiguity-averse agents, the policy rule features higher average inflation and increased responsiveness to fundamentals.