How To Discipline Financial Markets: Reputation Is Not Enough
通过实验室实验，研究了信息披露和资本要求两种干预措施对金融中介风险承担和破产的影响，发现资本要求能有效防止破产冲击实体经济，而信息披露则效果有限。
Abstract Historically, shocks originating in the financial sector often spilled over into the real sector with dramatic consequences. We study in the lab how interventions targeting disclosure and capital requirements of financial intermediaries can reduce insolvencies or prevent their negative effects from propagating to the broader economy. In our two-sector economy, consumers and producers can fund financial intermediaries, who, in turn, provide them with liquidity to settle trades. However, intermediaries may undertake risky investments and become insolvent, which depresses real economic activity. In the experiment, insolvencies were frequent. As a consequence, consumers and producers often refused to fund intermediaries, which lowered the trade volume. Imposing the disclosure of risky investments did not reduce risk-taking and insolvencies. Instead, imposing capital requirements prevented insolvencies from disrupting real economic activity, thus boosting financial intermediation and trade.