Auditor political connections and SEC oversight
研究审计师的政治关联（以政治行动委员会捐款衡量）是否影响美国证监会对审计客户的监管，发现关联度越高，客户越可能收到问询函和调查，但调查后是否发布执法公告则无显著关联。
Abstract We examine whether auditor political connections are associated with the SEC's oversight of audit clients . Specifically, we test whether auditors' political action committee contributions are associated with three SEC oversight actions: comment letters, investigations, and Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). Consistent with higher political connections inducing heightened scrutiny from the SEC, we find that the clients of auditors with higher political connections are more likely to receive comment letters and face SEC investigations. However, conditional on SEC investigation, we find no association between auditor political connections and the issuance of AAERs. We consider heightened attention from investors and analysts toward audit clients as one possible mechanism leading to increased SEC scrutiny because auditor political connections could be perceived as a red flag. Using EDGAR downloads and the number of earnings forecast revisions, we document evidence consistent with the existence of this mechanism. These findings add to our understanding of how auditor political connections could influence SEC oversight over audit clients.