Regulatory Capital Management to Exceed Thresholds
研究了胡萝卜政策（为合规提供好处而非惩罚违规）是否激励银行将资本水平提高到最低要求以上，发现银行会超越10%的监管阈值以降低存款保险费、获取经纪存款和扩大金融活动，但利用会计选择超越阈值会损害银行稳定性。
Abstract We investigate whether a carrot approach, which provides benefits for regulatory compliance rather than penalties for noncompliance, incentivizes banks to reach capital levels above the minimum requirements. We document a significant discontinuity at the 10% regulatory capital threshold, where banks receive benefits for exceeding it. Banks exceed it to pay lower deposit insurance fees, access brokered deposits, and expanded financial activities. Banks often rely on equity to reach this threshold while using accounting discretion primarily when facing small capital shortfalls. Our findings suggest the carrot approach can effectively increase banks' capital positions. However, we find that using accounting discretion to exceed the threshold hurts bank stability.